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This article is based on the assumption that values education has much to offer to a
country that is struggling to overcome a fractured moral landscape. Pursuing a
modest agenda, the focus of the article is on values and values education in the
context of schooling in South Africa. We suggest that debates about what constitutes
values and values education raise important philosophical and pedagogical ques-
tions about what values are and which values should be prioritized.  We contend that
it is unlikely that values education will in any significant way meet the expectations
of South Africa’s Constitution and its national school curriculum intentions, if it is
not underpinned by conceptual clarification of what values are in relation to the role
that values education is expected to fulfil in South Africa’s schools. Intended as a
conceptual investigation, the article explores different interpretations, tensions and
assumptions that confront the notions of values and values education. We suggest
that the insights from such a conceptual clarification could provide an appropriate
platform not only for a coherent approach to values education, but also for the more
effectual transfer and take up of values in schools. We favour a pragmatist concep-
tion based on the notion ‘shared goods’ in terms of which values education in
schools can lay the basis for dialogical encounters necessary for addressing our
country’s diverse and even divergent values orientations. 
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Introduction
There is arguably a serious decline in moral standards in many societies in general and among
the young in particular (see Hill, 1991; Halstead & Taylor, 1996.) Commenting on the reasons
for the perceived social moral decline, Weber (1990:89) suggests that 
… the problem of pluralistic perspectivism on the one hand and postmodernism’s critique
of Western reason on the other, undercut the foundation for classical models of education
to engender democratic competence and value formation. 
It is interesting that Weber ostensibly links moral degradation to the rise of a kind of concep-
tual relativism that informs our understanding of moral formation. Taking a more global-
sociological perspective, MacIntyre (1981) suggests that issues of morality and values forma-
tion have to be understood in the light of the complex reorientations of communities and their
traditions in a global context. He explains that value formation for the young occurs within a
global context that is constituted by the remnants and fragments of deconstructed value and
belief systems, cultures, traditions and political arrangements. In this regard young people in
South Africa face the challenge of holding in tandem the individual freedom to choose between
the exercise of personal values, while retaining, as a priority, commonly prized values in a
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democracy. To address the key questions that this article revolves around, we align ourselves
with Warnock (1967), who points to the importance of conceptual clarification. We now go on
to provide some definitional clarity that we suggest might be able to facilitate debate about
values and values education in our country. 
The literature indicates that ‘values’ is a fluid concept subject to different interpretations.
Values have been described in everyday language as ‘guides to action’ or ‘the moral compasses
by which to navigate our interaction with members of society’. Hill (1991:4) describes values
as “beliefs held by individuals to which they attach priority or worth and by which they tend
to order their lives”. Veugelers (2000:37) understands values as “judgments based on a notion
of what is good or bad; they refer to concepts of a just life”, while Morrow (1989) suggests that
instead of referring to values we could also refer to rules or principles that guide social life.
Halstead and Taylor (1996:2) hold that values refer to the “principles and convictions which
act as general guides to behaviour, the standards by which particular actions may be judged to
be good or bad”, while Levy (1993:2) understands values as “preferences for a certain form of
conduct”.
We agree with Green (2004), who pointed out that the literature does not provide a com-
mon understanding of what values are. This lack of clarity leaves room for speculation and
misinterpretation. For example, to interpret values in terms of ‘beliefs’ or ‘accepted standards’
or ‘guides to action’ or ‘preferences for a certain form of conduct’ is not very helpful. We
would suggest that a guiding principle is required that will provide conceptual clarity on how
to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable forms of conduct.
Some of these interpretations indicate that values are often mistakenly regarded as, and
confused with, social norms and traditions. According to Birch and Rasmussen (1989), norms
and traditions are social conventions that arise from, and are based on, habitual practices in
particular societies. Such social conventions, norms and traditions are most likely to be strong-
ly defined within homogenous social, religious, political or cultural contexts or within specific
communities (Veugelers, 2000). So, even though such conventions, norms and traditions may
be desirable and strongly held beliefs in particular communities and cultures, they may not
necessarily be considered as moral by others. Even if, as Birch and Rasmussen (1989) suggest,
values may be moral, non-moral or immoral, there still arise situations in which people differ
about whether particular social issues are moral, traditional, customary or social conventions. 
In an attempt to reach conceptual clarity about the meaning of values we proceed by
asking whether drawing a distinction between ‘values’ and ‘virtues’ might be helpful, as it
seems that in ordinary language these concepts are widely assumed to be synonymous. Wil-
liams (1995) challenges this assumption and argues that values and virtues are not synonyms
that can be used interchangeably. He distinguishes between values and virtues on the basis that
values refer to valuing qualities of things or persons that make them desirable, while virtues
refer to good habits and a disposition of the will towards goodness. Williams (1995) concedes
that values and virtues may at times intersect, but holds that while values may refer to what is
deemed to be desirable, they are not necessarily moral, whereas virtues are moral by definition. 
Values education 
The umbrella term ‘values education’ is commonly understood as placing a particular emphasis
on civic and moral values (Halstead & Taylor, 1996). Values education is therefore very
closely aligned to other terms currently used in the literature, including spiritual, moral, social
and cultural development. Lickona (1991) and Halstead and Taylor (1996) refer to character
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education, education in virtues and the development of attitudes and personal qualities. The
values education literature from the United Kingdom mostly refers to “values education,
character education, moral education, personal and social education, and citizenship education”
(Lickona, 1991:12). 
 Munn (1995) and Halstead and Taylor (1996) show that academic publications in the
United Kingdom mostly refer to ‘moral education’, while McLaughlin (2001) points out that
in European literature the term ‘civic education’ is commonly used. It seems that the umbrella
term ‘values education’ could be used interchangeably with other terms as it could refer to
human rights education, citizenship education, active citizenship and moral education, which
includes attention to attitudes and dispositions (see Bennett, 1992; Kohlberg, 1981; Nucci,
2001; Gutman, 1995). 
Kohlberg’s (1981:425) understanding of values as “making decisions which are moral and
acting in accordance with them” emphasises the link between decision making and agency
(moral behaviour). This provides an understanding of values and values education that reso-
nates with our own. If our aim is to improve moral decision making that translates into moral
actions, then logically we should be referring to ‘moral education’ or ‘education in virtues’, but
we don’t. Kohlberg (1981:57-58) lends support to this view and demonstrates the importance
of getting our conceptual clarification right and that this is not merely a question of semantics.
He argues that
…  if I could not define virtue … then could I really offer advice as to the means by which
virtue could be taught? Could it really be argued that the means for teaching obedience
to authority are the same as the means for teaching freedom of moral opinion …? It
appears then, that either we must be totally silent about moral education or else speak to
the nature of virtue. 
Veugelers (2000) points out that the various terms used in the literature each has its own as-
sumptions, epistemology and theoretical framework for values education. As a result of these
differences, different models of values education are available which may potentially produce
different outcomes. We conclude that, although different terms are being used in the literature
that discusses values, the term values education seems to be widely accepted.
We prefer the term values education as it succinctly captures our understanding of values
education as a collective, inclusive pedagogic endeavour in which formal and informal know-
ledges are important for successful values formation. While values education seems to be
conceptualized in terms of civics or citizenship education in most countries, South Africa faces
unique challenges in terms of how citizenship education is conceptualized. The intention of the
Constitution is that citizenship education should enable South Africans to transcend the racial
divisions and exclusionary values inherited from apartheid. Citizenship education should
provide a basis in terms of which people can engender a common citizenship for all based on
respect for human dignity. We now explore how citizenship education in South Africa is con-
ceptualized in response to this intention.
Citizenship education in South Africa
The South African Constitution (1996) refers to critical and democratic citizenship.  Ramphele
(2008:126) points out that the language used in the preamble to the Constitution affirms a com-
mitment to democratic practice and active citizenship. The key question for us is: how should
active citizenship in a democratic South Africa be understood? According to Ramphele (2008:
130), two variants of citizenship dominated South Africa’s moral landscape before 1994, i.e.
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the republican and liberal variants. Republican citizenship emphasizes self-governance and
active participation in state affairs, while liberal citizenship places the emphasis on the indi-
vidual rights and responsibilities of citizens. Robertson (2002) points out that what is common
to a variety of definitions of citizenship is the reciprocal relationship between rights and res-
ponsibilities. Social life does not only consist of the exercising of rights or the acceptance of
responsibilities, but is also constituted by moral codes which should guide citizens on how
these rights should be exercised and mediated.
In line with democratic practice, a liberal-communitarian view allows each individual to
pursue his or her personal interest, but it should be pointed out that liberal democracies also
depend on active citizenship, i.e. the engagement of citizens in social and political processes,
consideration for the welfare of others and strong moral codes for their continued existence.
Waghid (2004) acknowledges this point when he argues that citizenship education in South
Africa is guided by a combination of liberal and communitarian views of citizenship, but that
this guiding principle is inadequate in itself to produce the desired outcome of active citizens
who possess the mindsets, attitudes and values that enable democracies to thrive and to effect
social transformation.
Gultig, Hoadley and Jansen (2001:10) alert us to the significance of conceptual clarity in
the fostering of moral learning;
… if we are to intervene in the schooling process in order to foster moral learning and to
improve its quality, to encourage its diversity and enrich its outcomes, to mediate and
facilitate it, we need to develop an understanding of it.
A key question that arises is; what should the nature of values knowledge be that will empower
learners to become active moral citizens in a democratic society? It is to a consideration of this
that we now turn.
What is the nature of values knowledge?
Aristotle (1947) provided a framework in which he distinguishes between three different forms
of knowledge: theory (know that), technique (know how to) and moral insight (know why).
The latter he also referred to as contextual knowledge (phronesis) which in his view, acted as
a moral framework for the way in which knowledge is used. Ryle (1971) developed an ana-
lytical framework for the classification of the nature of knowledge which exhibits strong
Aristotelian influence. The framework adapted by Mason (1997) is particularly useful in
understanding the categorization of knowledge embedded in South Africa’s curriculum. Mason
distinguishes between propositional, procedural and dispositional knowledge, which relates to
‘knowing’, ‘doing’ and ‘being’, or in the language of outcomes-based education: knowledge,
skills and values. We acknowledge that ‘knowledge’ is a complex phenomenon and perhaps
not so easily categorized, but still consider these frameworks as useful analytical tools to un-
derstand the distinctiveness of the knowledge of values. 
Kerr suggests that each of these categories of knowledge translates into different approa-
ches and theoretical content that have implications for how citizenship (values) education is
conceptualized and transferred. According to Kerr (1999:22-29), these categories are:
• Education about citizenship which involves understanding of the governing structures and
constitutional processes of civil society (propositional knowledge);
• Citizenship through education which prepares for active involvement and participation
in community life (procedural knowledge);
• Education for active citizenship includes all of the above, but also aims to equip learners
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with values to prepare them, as Waghid (2004) has pointed out, for compassionate citi-
zenship.
The first approach has been criticized by Osler and Starkey (1996) as limited, because of its
strong emphasis on propositional knowledge to the exclusion of other dimensions of know-
ledge such as human rights (citizenship education.) Tibbuts (1995) emphasized the second
approach, but maintains that accompanying skills and values should be included. Reardon
(1995) stressed the need for values to centrally inform human rights, as she believes that the
moral aspects of rights are crucial to an appreciation and valuing of human rights, a view which
is consistent with the third approach.
Turning to the South African context, the mandate “to infuse human rights into the natio-
nal curriculum” was far from clear, according to Carrim & Keet (2005:99), who were members
of the Human Rights and Inclusivity Working Group (HRIWG) involved in developing the
Revised National Curriculum Statement (RNCS). They explain that this working group found
it difficult to infuse human rights into the OBE curriculum, which prioritized procedural
knowledge (Carrim & Keet, 2005: 99).  Gultig et al. (2002:115) explain that “this focus on
demonstrated, visible performance has the effect of emphasizing procedural knowledge at the
expense of propositional knowledge”. Mason (1997) corroborates this position by highlighting
that the learning of propositional and procedural knowledge without a firm grounding in a set
of shared values creates unthinking technocrats. Gibson (1986:1-19) describes technocratic
rationality as “a kind of intellectual activity which actually results in the decline of reason itself
and therefore stultifies, distorts and limits individual and social growth”.
There is agreement in the literature that the development of strong moral codes is a
necessary condition for active citizenship. Writing from a social constructivist approach, Hay-
don (1987) maintains that one of the most important aspects of morality is its concrete social
reality. He explains that morality is not only embedded in abstract ideas (propositional know-
ledge) or knowing how to do things (procedural knowledge), but in the everyday lived realities
of people as they engage in relationships in their social practices. If morality is exhibited in the
way we live, as Haydon (1987) suggests, then we need to ask: what does it mean to live as an
active moral citizen in South Africa?
Ramphela (2008:10) sees it as living with the “ghosts of the past”. Our contention is that
being an active moral citizen in South Africa also means living with ‘the nightmares of the
present’. South Africans are confronted by the HIV and AIDS pandemic which has left in its
wake thousands of orphans, massive unemployment, poverty, displaced people and illegal im-
migrants who are desperate for scarce job and educational opportunities, and many other social
ills. According to Ramphela (2008:12), we now live in a society permeated by a culture of
personal entitlement, personal enrichment, corruption, moral relativism parading on the crut-
ches of cultural pluralism and many other visible signs of the ‘I, me and myself’ pathology that
should be a matter of concern for all. 
Waghid (2004:528) picks up on this challenge when he warns that “individuals cannot
simply pursue their own self-interest without regard for the common good”. The point is that
members in a democracy usually value, claim and defend their individual freedom of choice
in respect of their personal value choices, but they ought to equally value a society where there
is adherence to the common good. This is a challenge for all democracies, including South
Africa. As Waghid (2004) suggests, the promotion of the public good depends on citizens’
active participation in the political process.  Kymlicka (2000:285) maintains that “without citi-
zens who possess these qualities, democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable”. 
In his critique of the republican view of citizenship, Kymlicka (1999:883-905) points out
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that “citizenship education is not simply a matter of knowledge of political processes and
functions of social institutions. It is also a matter of how we think about and behave towards
others”. Waghid (2004:44) advocates a similar view when he says that “learners are educated
to act responsibly … yet this would not necessarily guarantee that learners would become mo-
rally just”. The implication is that our current understanding of citizenship education might be
impoverished and too narrow, and that it could potentially be extended beyond simplistic
expressions of rights and responsibilities to include active participation of citizens in political
processes as well as addressing how we treat and behave towards others. 
 Following from this, the next point to consider is whether individual or common values
should be given priority in institutions of education and at what stage a critical disposition
towards values education as socialization or critical individuation should take place. The focus
in the next section is to open up conceptual space for a more plausible account of education for
active citizenship. 
Values priorities in education
Kohlberg (1981) sees moral development as part of a maturation process that can be facilitated
but not unduly hastened. His account of how people develop through this process is linked to
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development. Kohlberg (cited in Nucci, 2004) rejects the idea that
values education could be comprised of a moral agenda handed to educators that spells out lists
of values to be learnt without due consideration of the stage of moral development that learners
have reached. Rorty (1990) reminds us that we should not lose sight of the fact that (values)
education involves two distinct but equally necessary stages or processes: socialization and
critical individuation. For Rorty, the issue of the stage at which a critical disposition towards
values education as socialization or critical individuation should be developed entails under-
standing the purpose and nature of these processes.  In everyday parlance ‘socialization’ refers
to a continuing process whereby an individual acquires the norms, values, behaviour and social
skills of her society. The purpose of this process is conscious social and cultural reproduction,
that is, induction into the norms, values, customs and traditions valued by this society (Rorty,
1990). 
Dewey (1964) sees socialization as a process of shaping an ‘animal’ into a human being,
followed by the self-individuation and self-creation of that human being through his or her later
revolt against and questioning of that very process. Balibar (2004), in support of Dewey’s
position, maintains that the school holds a particular ‘place of transition’ between private and
public life. He believes that one of the functions of schooling is to prepare students for entering
the public sphere of citizenship. It involves a process of adjusting their primary identities as
private individuals to assume a secondary identity as citizens of the modern state. Balibar
(2004:358) explains that in this process the school
… has to virtually detach individuals from their primary identities … (which is a violent
process … — a sort of dismemberment, a separation from their identities), but which then
ideally allows these identities to be claimed  … in terms of a common political identity.
Detaching individuals from their socialized identities depends on cultivating a critical dispo-
sition towards, and having deliberative discussions about, the accepted rules, norms and values
(received ideas) of society, which, according to Bak (2004:45), can already begin at primary
school level. The aim of this deliberative attitude towards learners’ socialization is to empower
them with thinking tools to make sound moral decisions and engage in moral behaviour.
If one takes on board the views of Rorty, Dewey, Balibar and Bak, then schools should
provide the appropriate environment for socialization augmented by critical individuation,
230 Solomons & Fataar
which is a process of inciting doubt, stimulating the imagination and inducing critical thinking,
thereby challenging and removing the barriers that socialization inevitably imposes. We there-
fore contend that education for active citizenship in schools ought to extend beyond an
emphasis on rights and responsibilities and the symbols of citizenship. It ought to empower
learners to recognize and engage with present-day challenges facing society in order to foster
a commitment to developing a reorientation away from the values and practices defined by
racism, a lack of respect for human dignity and devaluing of diversity. Enabling students to
contribute actively to the common good beyond minimalist liberal citizenship expectations is
necessary, but education cannot succeed in doing this alone; it needs support and sanction from
society. Morrow (1989) alerts us to the importance of a societal culture conducive to comple-
menting and underpinning a vigorous critical educational platform. He explains that “immature
human beings are dependent not only for their survival, but also for development into rational
beings on the benevolent (compassionate) actions of the human beings amongst whom they
live” (Morrow, 1989:117).
Implications for values education in South Africa
In the light of these views, what are the implications for values education in South Africa? We
believe that the debate about values education in South Africans should acknowledge the
different interpretations of ‘values,’ ‘values education’ and ‘citizenship education’, and work
towards a pragmatic and shared inter-subjective understanding of the meaning that should be
ascribed to these notions. Morrow (1989:176) provides some insight into such a pragmatist
position when he alerts us to the importance of values as ‘shared goods’. He suggests that, 
… shared goods are not merely the convergence of various interests, but articulation of
principles which give unity and direction to the life of the community … their common
appreciation is constitutive of them … what binds a community together is shared goods.
Without these shared goods, processes of generating social cohesion would suffer the loss of
a sense of common purpose and a shared future. Morrow’s view alerts us to those moral posi-
tions that minimally bind societies and help to lay out the terrain for inter-subjective generative
processes. Observance of the rule of law and respect for diversity, for example, are regarded
as shared values or moral dispositions that every South African is bound to observe. Failure
to do so would continue to lead to speculation, conceptual confusion and conflicting opinions
as to what values are and the role of values in society. Furthermore, the distinction between
values and virtues — what is desirable and what is moral, or in simplistic terms what is good
or bad or right or wrong — is crucial as a guiding principle for negotiating and navigating the
confusing maze of relations that constitute social life. 
The national curriculum’s preoccupation with procedural knowledge appears to be in-
congruent with the Constitution’s expectation of generating an active, critical citizenry. It is
apparent, therefore, that the curriculum as the ‘social instrument’ meant to facilitate values
acquisitions is conceptually misaligned with the Constitution. As Kymlicka (2000:888) pointed
out “citizenship education is not simply a matter of knowledge of political and constitutional
institutions (procedural knowledge). It is also a matter of how we think and behave towards
others”. We would thus argue that the school curriculum should be conceptually aligned to a
broader conception of values that combines propositional, procedural and dispositional know-
ledge orientations. This, we suggest, will open up conceptual space for a critical and active
citizenship orientation to values education in our country’s schools. 
We advance the view that a commitment to values education in schools, alert to the re-
quirements for building a shared understanding about which values might be best fostered in
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classrooms, informed by an appreciation of how values may be properly taught at the different
levels of the schooling system, remains the key to generating a questioning and productive
citizenry in South Africa. Values education has much to offer to a society that is experiencing
an increase in moral arbitrariness, a lack of understanding of what is moral action is, and
incipient relativist views about our commitment to eradicating gender, class and racial in-
equalities. Informed by an ethics of mutuality, values education in schools could lay a basis for
dialogical encounters that can engage our fractured values orientations. 
Conclusion
This article sought to address what is meant by values and values education in the context of
South Africa’s education system. Our position is that it is unlikely that values education will
in any significant way meet the expectations of the Constitution and the revised school curri-
culum if it is not informed by careful clarification.  An important conclusion drawn from this
article is the need for further ongoing discussion, intelligent deliberation and reconceptuali-
zation of values education in South Africa’s national curriculum. We are aware of the fact that
there remain unexamined aspects and challenges relating to values education that still need to
be resolved. We acknowledge that the current policy orientations of the government fall short
in providing a basis for productive values education in schools. We believe that the resolution
of these shortcomings is a precondition for a coherent policy for values education. 
The final issue that we raise relates to the silences, gaps, challenges and unresolved issues
between the expectations set forth for values education in the Constitution and the lived reality
of values education in the context of South Africa’s schools. If the expectation is that values
education should prepare learners and students for active citizenship, then the curriculum
should be aligned to this expectation. It should be geared towards preparing them purposefully
and adequately to acquire the conceptual tools needed for active citizenship in a democratic
society. This article has aimed to provide one response to the ongoing investigation and elabo-
ration of the best way to address these issues.
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